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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MEMORANDUM DOES NOT SUPPORT AFFIRMANCE OF 
THE GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The Court should reject UDOT's suggestion that the trial court's erroneous 
dismissal of Mr. Johnson's claim should be upheld because one portion of Mr. Johnson's 
opposition memorandum purportedly violated rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, as it then existed. As UDOT correctly points out, Mr. Johnson's 
memorandum below did not begin with a numbered restatement of the proposed 
"undisputed facts" presented by UDOT that Mr. Johnson contended were in dispute. 
Instead, Mr. Johnson presented his own statement of facts at pages 1-4 of his 
memorandum and addressed UDOT's proposed facts on pages 5-8. (See PL's Mem. Opp. 
Mot. for Summ. J. ("Johnson Opp. Mem."), Add. Ex. 7 hereto, R. 862-869.) UDOT did 
not object to this presentation of the facts below, and in fact conceded many of Mr. 
Johnson's facts. But at the hearing on the motion, the trial court sua sponte concluded 
that the memorandum violated rule 4-501 and ruled that Mr. Johnson's facts would not be 
considered in determining whether UDOT's proposed facts were disputed: 
Specifically, the Court finds that Facts 1-20 on pages 1-4 of Plaintiffs 
Opposition to Defendant UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment do not 
conform with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, and therefore, those facts do not dispute UDOT's State-
ment of Facts. While plaintiffs response to UDOT Facts 3, 5, 6, 20, 21, 
22, 23, 24, and 26, found on pages 5-8 of Plaintiffs Opposition to 
Defendant UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment does conform with Rule 
4-501, plaintiffs response to those facts does not establish any genuine 
issues of fact which would preclude summary judgment. 
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(Order of Summary Judgment and Dismissal with Prejudice, Add. Ex. 8 hereto, R. 1158, 
U 1 (italics in original, bold added).) 
The trial court's ruling has no bearing on the issues before the Court on appeal, 
because the trial court ruled only that Mr. Johnson's facts would not be deemed to dispute 
UDOT's facts, and Mr. Johnson does not rely on those facts to dispute UDOT's facts. 
Instead, Mr. Johnson relies on those facts to show that UDOT is not entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. If the trial court had ruled that Mr. Johnson's facts should be stricken 
or disregarded entirely, such a ruling should be reversed, because (i) the memorandum 
did comply with rule 4-501, and (ii) any violation would have been purely technical and 
would not justify such an extreme substantive sanction. 
A. The trial court's order has no bearing on the issues on appeal. 
UDOT misrepresents the record when it repeatedly claims that the trial court 
ordered that the facts Mr. Johnson presented at pages 1 through 4 of his memorandum 
"would not be considered for purposes of summary judgment." (See, e.g., UDOT Br. at 
23.) Actually, as quoted above, the trial court merely ruled that Mr. Johnson's facts 
would not be used to dispute UDOTs facts. This is a critical distinction, because Mr. 
Johnson is not relying on the facts presented at pages 1-4 to dispute UDOT's proposed 
undisputed facts. Instead, Mr. Johnson relies on those facts to demonstrate that UDOT 
has not met its burden of showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
Mr. Johnson's amended complaint alleges that UDOT and Granite were both 
negligent by, among other things, failing to warn drivers of the dangerous condition, 
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failing to properly control freeway traffic or provide a safe lane of travel, and failing to 
"provide a safe zone between the lane of travel and the construction area." (See 
Amended Complaint ^ 12, R. 99.) Mr. Johnson also alleges that UDOT negligently 
failed to properly supervise Granite in its management of the project, and that UDOT is 
vicariously liable for Granite's negligence as well. (Id, ^[ 3, 13.) 
When UDOT moved for summary judgment, UDOT did not dispute any of Mr. 
Johnson's allegations that UDOT was negligent. Instead, UDOT asserted that (l)its 
negligence in failing to require a concrete barrier was immunized under the discretionary 
function exception of the Governmental Immunity Act; (2) it had no duty to ensure that 
the freeway was safe during the project because the UDOT-Granite contract required 
Granite to carry out the Traffic Control Plan; (3) its negligence in overseeing Granite was 
immunized under the Act's "inspection" exception; and (4) Mr. Johnson's vicarious 
liability claims are barred because Granite was an independent contractor. (See Mem. 
Supp. Def. UDOT's Mot. for Summ. J., UDOT Brief Ex. 1, R. 691-706.) 
In support of its motion, UDOT offered 28 purportedly "Undisputed Facts," almost 
all of which addressed UDOT's failure to require a concrete barrier. UDOT's argument 
regarding its failure to provide a safe freeway was based on two facts, quoting the 
UDOT-Granite contract. (See |cl at R. 683-84 (Facts 8 and 9), 703-04.) UDOT cited no 
facts supporting its argument that the inspection exception immunized its failure to 
monitor Granite's work, and no facts supporting its claim that it was not liable for Gra-
nite's negligence because Granite was an independent contractor. (See id. at R. 704-06.) 
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In his opposition memorandum, Mr. Johnson disputed nine of UDOT's facts 
(pages 5-8) and set forth additional facts showing that UDOT was not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law (pages 1-4). (Johnson Opp. Mem., Add. Ex. 7 hereto, R. 
862-69.) To dispute the 28 facts UDOT offered, Mr. Johnson did exactly as rule 4-501 
required: He separately listed, by number, each of UDOT's facts that he disputed, and for 
each such fact he explained why he disputed it.1 Thus, the memorandum made absolutely 
clear which of UDOT's 28 proposed facts Mr. Johnson disputed, and why. 
Because Mr. Johnson is not relying on the facts from pages 1-4 to dispute UDOT's 
proposed facts, the trial court's ruling does not support its grant of summary judgment. 
Summary judment cannot be granted unless the movant establishes both (1) that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact, and (2) that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). And Mr. Johnson's opposition, and the 
arguments on appeal, primarily address the second requirement of rule 56. 
For example, Mr. Johnson does not assert that his claim for UDOT's failure to 
ensure that the freeway was safe should be reinstated because UDOT's facts are disputed', 
instead, Mr. Johnson argues that those claims should be reinstated because UDOT failed 
to establish its right to judgment as a matter of law. UDOT insists that it had no duty to 
provide a safe highway during construction because the UDOT-Granite contract required 
Granite to implement the Traffic Control Plan. Mr. Johnson does not dispute what the 
For three of UDOT's proposed facts, Mr. Johnson did not cite to the specific 
parts of the record that supported his contentions. 
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contract says; rather, Mr. Johnson disputes that the contract shields UDOT from liability. 
Thus, as far as this portion of Mr. Johnson's claim is concerned, Mr. Johnson is not 
relying on the facts from pages 1-4 to dispute any of the 28 facts UDOT presented. 
Therefore, the trial court's order that Mr. Johnson's facts "do not dispute UDOT's 
Statement of Facts" does not affect that issue.3 
Because UDOT presented no affidavits or other evidence establishing that it was 
not negligent, Mr. Johnson was not required to present affidavits or other evidence 
supporting his negligence claim. See, e.g.. Wilkinson v. Union Pac. R. Co.. 975 P.2d 
464, 465 (Utah 1998) ("Because Union Pacific has offered no affidavits disputing 
Wilkinson's allegations, it has not met its burden of showing that there are no material 
issues of fact. Consequently, Wilkinson may rely on the allegations in her pleadings."). 
UDOT's negligence is therefore assumed for purposes of the motion, and Mr. Johnson did 
not need to "prove" his claim against UDOT to oppose the motion. Instead, UDOT had 
to establish as a matter of law that Mr. Johnson's claims against UDOT were barred. 
As explained in Mr. Johnson's opening brief, (1) an agreement between UDOT 
and a third party cannot relieve UDOT of its own duty to the public to provide a safe road 
(Johnson Opening Br. at 19-20), (2) the UDOT-Granite contract does not relieve UDOT 
of liability for its own negligence (id at 20), (3) a highway authority's duty to provide a 
safe road does not disappear during construction (id at 20-21), and (4) the "retained 
control" doctrine required UDOT to act reasonably in exercising its control over Granite 
(kL at 21-23). 
The same reasoning applies to the other issues. For example, Mr. Johnson's 
argument regarding the "negligent inspection" exception does not rely on disputing 
UDOT's facts, since there were none, but instead on the legal argument that the exception 
does not apply. (See Johnson Opening Br. at 17-19.) Similarly, Mr. Johnson's argument 
on vicarious liability does not depend on disputing UDOT's facts. (See Johnson Opening 
Br. at 24-26.) Regarding UDOT's "discretionary function" argument, any factual disputes 
that Mr. Johnson relies on were properly presented at pages 5-8 of the memorandum, 
which the trial court recognized in its Order. (See Add. Ex. 8.) 
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A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. See id. at 464-65. Therefore, 
the issue before this Court is the same as the issue that faced the trial court: Do the 194 
undisputed facts UDOT presented establish as a matter of law that Mr. Johnson's claims 
against UDOT should be dismissed? And the answer is no. UDOT simply did not 
establish that it had no duty to the driving public to provide a safe highway during the 
construction, that the "inspection" exception immunizes it from liability, that it is not 
liable for Granite's negligence, or that the discretionary function exception applies. Thus, 
the judgment should be reversed, notwithstanding the trial court's 4-501 ruling. 
Indeed, even if the trial court had ordered the facts set forth on pages 1-4 stricken, 
instead of just ignored for purposes of determining what facts were undisputed, that still 
would not affect any of the arguments raised on appeal. The facts on which Mr. Johnson 
most relies as examples of UDOT's negligence are (1) UDOT's authorizing the second 
lane to be open right next to the travel lane, and (2) UDOT's failure to ensure compliance 
with the Traffic Control Plan, which required solid white striping, a two-foot buffer zone, 
and barrels. But in addition to being stated on pages 1-4 of Johnson1 s memorandum, 
those facts were also stated on pages 14 and 15 of Johnson's memorandum. (Johnson 
Opp. Mem., Add. Ex. 7 hereto, R. 875-76.) Thus, even without pages 1-4, those facts 
were properly presented to the trial court, and the trial court wras made fully aware of 
them before ruling on UDOT's summary judgment motion.5 
4
 Pages 5-8 of Mr. Johnson's opposition memorandum disputed nine of UDOT's 28 
proposed facts. 
5
 Notably, the rules do not require that a nonmovant's additional facts be in a 
separate section. 
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In fact, not only did UDOT fail to object to Mr. Johnson's facts below, UDOT 
even conceded, for purposes of the motion, that UDOT authorized the second lane to be 
open, that the Traffic Control Plan required white striping, and that "certain aspects of the 
Traffic Control Plan were not followed on the night of plaintiffs accident." (UDOT 
Reply Mem., R. 1026, 1031.) Given that UDOT essentially stipulated to those facts 
below, it is specious for UDOT to now argue, on appeal, that those facts should be 
entirely disregarded.6 
Finally, UDOT does not explain what this Court should do if the facts from pages 
1-4 were to be disregarded. As noted above, because UDOT did not controvert that it 
was negligent, UDOT's negligence is conclusively presumed, and the judgment can be 
affirmed only if UDOT has established defenses to Mr. Johnson's claims. And UDOT 
has not done so. Indeed, because this Court reviews the grant of summary judgment de 
novo, it is difficult to see how the trial court's ruling could affect this Court's treatment of 
the appeal. Therefore, the Court should disregard UDOT's attempt to divert the Court's 
attention, and should address on the merits the substantive issues Mr. Johnson raised in 
his opening brief. 
6
 In fact, it is disingenuous for UDOT to challenge, as it does on pages 23-25 of its 
brief, the evidence supporting Mr. Johnson's assertions regarding the opening of the 
second lane or the requirements and violations of the Traffic Control Plan. Once again, 
UDOT conceded these facts below. For example: 
Plaintiff claims that UDOT's field engineer or inspector gave Granite 
authority to open two lanes of traffic during off-peak hours if there were no 
workers in that part of the construction zone. For purposes of this Motion 
for Summary Judgment, UDOT does not dispute that fact. 
(R. 1031 (emphasis added).) 
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B. Disregarding the facts would be error. 
If the trial court's ruling were to be construed as an order striking the facts set forth 
in pages 1 through 4 of Johnson's trial court memorandum, then such a ruling would be 
an abuse of discretion and should not be upheld. 
1. Mr. Johnson's memorandum complied with rule 4-501. 
When the case was argued below, rule 4-501 stated as follows: 
The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a verbatim restatement 
of each of the movant fs statement of facts as to which the party contends 
a genuine issue exists followed by a concise statement of material facts 
which support the party fs contention. Each disputed fact shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of 
the record upon which the opposing party relies. All material facts set forth 
in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference 
to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary 
judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's 
statement. 
CJA 4-501(2)(B) (repealed effective November 1, 2003) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, an opposition memorandum need not actually "begin with" the 
restatement of the movant's facts. Rather, the memorandum must begin with a section 
that contains the restatement of the movant's facts. Mr. Johnson's opposition 
memorandum complies with this requirement, as Mr. Johnson's restatement of UDOT's 
n 
UDOT is incorrect in claiming that Mr. Johnson has waived his right to 
challenge the trial court's ruling. Because UDOT raised the issue in its opposition brief, 
Mr. Johnson is well within his rights to respond to this "new matter" in his reply; that's 
exactly what a reply brief is for. See, e.g., Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ^J10, 16 P.3d 
540 (f'[I]f an appellant responds in the reply brief to a new issue raised by the appellee in 
its opposing brief, the issue is not waived."). 
Moreover, Mr. Johnson did not challenge the trial court's ruling because, as noted 
above, the trial court's ruling, properly construed, does not affect the appeal. But if 
UDOT is going to claim that the order is much broader than it really is, Mr. Johnson 
clearly has the right to respond. 
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facts appeared in the opening "section" of his memorandum. On the first page of the 
memorandum, Mr. Johnson began with a section heading entitled "FACTS", which was 
presented in bold face, offset from the surrounding text, centered, capitalized, and 
underlined. (See Johnson Opp. Mem., Add. Ex. 7 hereto, R. 862.) Then, after presenting 
20 facts on pages 1-4, Mr. Johnson included the following paragraph at the top of page 5; 
In addition to Plaintiffs foregoing statement of facts, which 
dispute the facts alleged in UDOTfs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Plaintiff individually disputes UDOT's "undisputed facts" by UDOT's 
paragraph numbers. Plaintiff[] disputes Fact Nos. 3, 5, 6, 20, 21, 22, 
23, 24, and 26 as follows: 
(Id. at R. 866 (bold-faced text in original).) 
While this paragraph was presented in bold face, it was not offset from the rest of 
the text, nor was it centered, capitalized, or underlined. After this paragraph, Mr. 
Johnson listed the UDOT facts he disputed, by number, and explained why he disputed 
them. Finally, the middle of page eight contained another bold-faced, offset, centered, 
capitalized, underlined heading, entitled 'ARGUMENT." (See id at R. 869.) 
In other words, the first "section" of Mr. Johnson's brief, entitled "FACTS", went 
from page one to page eight, followed by the second "section," "ARGUMENT". And 
this first section clearly "contained" the "verbatim restatement" of UDOT's facts. 
Therefore, Mr. Johnson's memorandum "beg[a]n with a section containing a verbatim 
restatement," as rule 4-501 requires. 
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2. Even if there was technical noncompliance, it would 
be error to disregard the facts presented at pages 1-4. 
Even if pages 5-8 of the memorandum are deemed to be a separate "section," it 
would still be an abuse of discretion to disregard the first four pages of Mr. Johnson's 
opposition memorandum, since any violation would be purely technical and harmless. 
Regardless of what section it was in, Mr. Johnson clearly complied with rule 4-50l's 
requirement that he restate verbatim each fact he disputed, in separate numbered 
sentences, explain why each fact is disputed, and cite the record for support. Thus, the 
memorandum made absolutely clear which of UDOT's 28 proposed facts Mr. Johnson 
disputed and why. Mr. Johnson's only "error," if there was one, was that his 
memorandum did not technically "begin with" the section addressing UDOT's facts; 
instead, the section addressing UDOT's facts began on page 5 of the memorandum.8 
Contrary to UDOT's representation, this case is not like Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT 
App 291, 77 P.3d 339. In Fennell the party opposing the summary judgment motion 
"did not refer to Defendants' statements of uncontroverted facts, but instead included only 
his own statement of undisputed facts." Id. 11 7, 77 P.3d at 341 (emphasis added). In 
affirming the trial court, this Court specifically emphasized the portion of rule 4-501 
stating that a movant's facts will be "deemed admitted. . . unless specifically controverted 
by the opposing party's statement" See id. (emphasis in original). The Court in Fennell 
8
 In other words, instead of looking at page 1 or 2 to see which facts Mr. Johnson 
was disputing, the trial court had to look at page 5. This does not support the trial court's 
suggestion that it was "very hard" to determine what facts were disputed, or that doing so 
would require the trial court to sift through "six inches of paper and put it together for 
[itself]." (See UDOT Opening Br. at 22-23 (quoting Hearing Tr, R. 1195:4-5).) The 
paragraph at the top of page 5 listed all nine facts Mr. Johnson was disputing, and the 
next three pages explained why. 
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also discussed and relied on the Utah Supreme Court case of Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. 
DisU 2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d 705, which had also relied on the "deemed admitted" 
provision of rule 4-501. See Fennell \ g, 77 P.3d at 342. 
As noted above, the "deemed admitted" provision of rule 4-501 does not apply 
because Mr. Johnson's opposition memorandum did "specifically controvert" UDOT's 
facts. And the reasoning of Fennell does not apply because, unlike the situation in 
Fennell there is absolutely no prejudice or difficulty caused by Mr. Johnson's addressing 
the "disputed facts" second, instead of first, in his memorandum. 
A very recent Utah Supreme Court case - decided after UDOT filed its brief -
makes it clear that minor, technical noncompliance with rule 4-501 does not justify 
imposing substantive consequences on litigants. See Salt Lake County v. Metro West 
Ready Mix, 2004 UT 23, If 23 n.4, 496 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 2004 WL 555724 (March 23, 
2004). In Metro West, a land dispute between Salt Lake County and a private owner, the 
owner moved for summary judgment, and the County's memorandum "did not set forth 
disputed facts listed in numbered sentences in a separate section as required by the Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration." Id. Nevertheless, despite this clear violation of rule 4-
501, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the movant's request that its facts be deemed 
admitted: 
It is true that the County's opposing memorandum did not set forth disputed 
facts in numbered sentences in a separate section as required by the Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration. See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(2)(B). 
However, given that the disputed facts were clearly provided in the body 
of the memorandum with applicable record references, we find that the 
failure to comply with the technical requirements of rule 4-501 (2)(B) to 
be harmless in this case. [Citation omitted.] Accordingly, we examine 
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whether the County's disputed facts are sufficient to preclude summary 
judgment in favor of Metro West. 
Id. (brackets omitted) (emphasis added). Cf. Hall v. NACM Intermountain, Inc.; 1999 
UT 97, H1119-21, 988 P.2d 942 (noting that the failure of a fee affidavit to set forth the legal 
basis for the award, as required by CJA 4-505, was harmless, where the court and the attorneys 
knew the basis for the award). 
Metro West's reasoning applies here. As in Metro West Johnson's failure to 
comply with the "technical requirements of rule 4-501(2)(B)" is harmless. Indeed, the 
violation in Metro West was far more significant than the violation in the present case. 
As noted above, Johnson's opposition memorandum did identify, in numbered sentences, 
UDOT's facts that he contended were disputed; he just did it on pages 5-8 instead of 1-4. 
If it was harmless for the nonmovant in Metro West to not even have a disputed fact 
section, it was certainly harmless for Johnson to list the disputed facts after his own facts. 
Significantly, the Judicial Council has now eliminated the "begin with" require-
ment. Instead, under the present rule, it is sufficient that the nonmovant's memorandum 
contain such a response: 
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a 
verbatim restatement of eich of the moving party's facts that is contro-
verted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. 
For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party 
shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by 
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B) (emphasis added). If it were substantively important that an 
opposition memorandum "begin with" the response to the movant's statement of undis-
puted facts, the requirement would not have been eliminated. Moreover, that the require-
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ment has now been eliminated demonstrates even more that it would be unjust to impose 
substantive consequences on Mr. Johnson for his memorandum, when his memorandum 
would be in perfect compliance with the rule if it were filed today. 
It would be grossly unfair for material facts to be utterly disregarded, for what is, 
at most, a purely technical violation of a rule that no longer even exists. The purposes of 
the civil judicial system are to determine the truth and dispense justice accordingly. 
Ignoring undisputed facts simply because they were placed in the wrong part of a 
memorandum would frustrate these important goals. Moreover, imposing such an 
extreme substantive punishment, without even giving Mr. Johnson a chance to correct 
any noncompliance, would be unjust. Therefore, if the trial court's order is somehow 
construed as striking the facts presented at pages 1-4 of Mr. Johnson's opposition brief, 
that order would be an abuse of discretion and should be reversed. 
II. UDOT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT MR. JOHNSON'S CLAIMS ARE 
BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. The "negligent inspection" exception does not apply. 
UDOT has not cited a single case that would suggest that the "negligent 
inspection" exception to the Governmental Immunity Act's waiver of immunity applies to 
UDOT's failure to ensure the safety of its own freeway. As explained in Mr. Johnson's 
opening brief, his claim against UDOT is not limited to a failure to "inspect" the freeway, 
but rather a failure to take reasonable steps to ensure that the freeway was reasonably safe 
on September 14, 1996. Moreover, UDOT relies on three cases, but Mr. Johnson has 
already explained that none of those cases even remotely supports UDOT, because those 
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cases unequivocally establish that the inspection exception does not apply to a govern-
mental entity's failure to safely maintain its own property? 
It is absurd for UDOT to claim that the inspection exception immunizes it from 
liability for "fail[ing] to monitor Granite's work or inspect the [Project] for purposes of 
ensuring that Granite complied with the traffic control plan." (See UDOT Br. at 39.) As 
explained in Mr. Johnson's opening brief, UDOT had a duty to the driving public to take 
reasonable steps to ensure the safety of the freeway, and this duty continued during the 
construction project. (See Johnson Opening Br. at 20-21.10) Thus, UDOT's duty was not 
9
 See Ilott v. Univ. of Utah, 2000 UT App 286, ffi[ 6-16, 12 P.3d 1011 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2000); Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 270-71 (Utah 1995); Ericksen 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995, 997-98 (Utah 1993). 
10
 As noted in Mr. Johnson's opening brief, Utah courts have apparently not 
squarely addressed whether the state has the duty to furnish reasonably safe highways. 
But Utah courts have long held that cities have a "nondelegable" duty to provide safe 
streets. Rg,, Rollow v. Ogden City, 66 Utah 475, 243 P. 791, 794-95 (1926) ("positive 
legal duty" imposed on cities to maintain streets in reasonably safe condition); Morris v. 
Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 474, 101 P. 373, 377 (1909) (city has "constant, continuing, and 
nondelegable" duty "to exercise reasonable care to maintain the streets in a reasonably 
safe condition"). There is no reason to think that the state would be subject to any less of 
a duty on its highways. Indeed, other jurisdictions routinely recognize the duty of the 
state to exercise due care to make its highways reasonably safe. See, e.g., Wisener v. 
State, 598 P.2d 511, 513 (Ariz. 1979) ("The standard of care required of the State in 
keeping its highways safe is the same as that of a municipality."); Yager v. Deane, 853 
P.2d 1214, 1217 (Mont. 1993) ("[T]he State has a general duty to keep highways in a 
reasonably safe condition . . . ."); Lerma v. State Highway Dept. of New Mexico, 877 
P.2d 1085, 1087 (N.M. 1994) (highway department "has always had the common-law 
duty to exercise ordinary care to protect the general public from foreseeable harm on the 
highways of the state"). Indeed, in McCorvey v. UDOT, 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 1993), the 
Utah Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict against UDOT for negligence in planning and 
overseeing a construction project. "Although LeGrand was responsible for the actual 
resurfacing on the project, UDOT supplied the traffic control plan and was ultimately 
responsible for motorist safety." Id. at 42. McCorvey did not need to hold that UDOT 
had a duty to exercise due care during the construction project, because UDOT did not 
dispute the finding that it was negligent; instead, UDOT contested whether its negligence 
proximately caused the accident at issue. 
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to inspect Granite, or Granite's work, but rather to inspect the freeway, and to take 
reasonable steps to correct any dangerous conditions that existed, regardless of who 
caused them.11 
If the inspection exception applied in this case, then governmental entities would 
rarely be liable for a dangerous conditions in government buildings, as practically any 
danger can be characterized as a failure to "inspect" the property. Thus, in the absence of 
a single case suggesting that the negligent inspection applies here, the Court should reject 
UDOT's claim to immunity for its negligence in failing to take reasonable steps during 
the course of the construction project to ensure that the freeway was safe. 
B. UDOTfs contract with Granite does not relieve UDOT of its duty 
to the public to maintain a safe highway. 
Once again, UDOT has failed to cite a single authority supporting its position that 
it had no duty to the public to exercise due care during the construction. Instead, UDOT 
relies entirely on its own contract with Granite, but UDOT misses the point. As stated 
above, UDOT had a duty to the public under both the common law and the Utah Code to 
take reasonable steps to provide a safe freeway, and UDOT's contract with Granite, a 
private party looking out for its own interests, simply cannot relieve UDOT of this duty. 
Utah has long recognized that a public entity's duty to provide safe roads is "non-
delegable." A 1909 Utah Supreme Court case is particularly instructive: 
11
 Indeed, UDOT's "inspection" argument would not apply to UDOT's failure to 
correct defects that its employees actually knew about through their "inspections" of the 
freeway. UDOT's argument also ignores the part of Mr. Johnson's claim arising out of 
UDOT's active negligence in "failing to provide a safe zone between the lane of travel 
and the construction area" (Amended Complaint f 12(f), R. 99) by authorizing a driving 
lane to be open right next to the cutouts at night on the unlighted freeway. 
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In this connection it must not be overlooked that it was the primary duty of 
the city to exercise reasonable care to maintain the streets in a reasonably 
safe condition and to guard against injury to persons or property by 
removing or making reasonably safe any dangerous objects in the streets. 
This duty was constant, continuing, and nondelegable. 
Morris v. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 474, 101 P. 373, 377 (1909) (emphasis added). In 
Morris, Salt Lake City was held liable for property damage caused by an independent 
contractor whom the City hired to lay a sidewalk. The contractor cut the roots of several 
trees, which subsequently fell onto the plaintiffs house. The court held that the City was 
liable for its failure to remedy the dangerous condition the contractor created by leaving 
the trees standing unsupported. 
Mr. Birch [the contractor] therefore caused the dangerous condition of the 
trees, and both he and the city negligently permitted the danger to remain, 
in consequence of which the injury to plaintiffs house and property 
resulted. The doctrine that we invoke is generally applied where excava-
tions or other obstacles are placed in the streets by a contractor in making 
some improvement in a street, and where such excavations or obstacles 
are left unprotected and unguarded in consequence of which an injury 
results to a traveler or to one lawfully using the street. . . . In either case 
the city and the contractor are not held liable because of doing the work, but 
because in doing it a danger is created which is negligently permitted to 
exist by reason of which injuries and damages result to someone. 
Id. at 378 (emphasis added). The court further explained that the City had a claim against 
the contractor for indemnification: 
Moreover, as between him and the city, it was perfectly proper for them to 
contract with respect to such dangers. While the city could not avoid 
liability as to others with respect to primary duties imposed upon it by law, 
it nevertheless could, by contract, require Mr. Birch to indemnify it against 
all such claims. 
Id. at 378-79 (emphasis added). 
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As in Morris, UDOT cannot "avoid liability as to others with respect to primary 
duties imposed upon it by law" by contracting with Granite. Further, as in Morris, even 
though Granite was hired to do the work, UDOT is still liable for its own failure to take 
reasonable steps to ensure that the freeway was reasonably safe.12 
Indeed, UDOT's position is inconsistent with other well-accepted principles of tort 
liability. For example, when a private party engages an independent contractor to per-
form work on land that is open to the public, the private party is liable for his failure to 
exercise reasonable care to protect the public against unreasonably dangerous conditions 
created by the contractor. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) Torts § 415 (1977). The same 
reasoning would apply to the present case: UDOT, as the owner of the highway that was 
open to the public, is liable for its own failure to exercise reasonable care to protect the 
public against unreasonably dangerous conditions created by the contractor, which would 
certainly include allowing traffic to proceed at freeway speeds mere inches from concrete 
cutouts, with no lighting or separation. Similarly, the employer of an independent 
contractor is liable when the employer negligently gives the contractor instructions, and 
an injury results from the contractor's adherence to those instructions. Id. § 410. Thus, 
UDOT is liable for its own negligence in directing or authorizing Granite to open the 
second lane. There is no basis to conclude that these duties of the employer to the public 
could be limited by the terms of a contract between the employer and the contractor. 
It is also significant that Morris expressly recognizes that a public entity in 
charge of a road is liable for "excavations" in the road that are left "unprotected and 
unguarded." 101 P. at 378. 
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Finally, UDOT has failed to adequately respond to Mr. Johnson's argument that 
UDOT is liable under the "retained control" doctrine. As it did below, UDOT claims that 
the doctrine does not apply because the UDOT-Granite contract purportedly allowed 
Granite to utilize the "means and methods by which the proposed traffic control plan 
would be implemented and enforced." (UDOT Br. at 41.) But even though Granite may 
have had the choice of how to implement the Plan, that does not mean that Granite had 
the choice of whether to implement the Plan. 
Instead, as explained in Mr. Johnson's opening brief, Granite was required to 
adhere to the Traffic Control Plan UDOT formulated, Granite could not remove signs, 
barriers, or protective devices "without permission of the ENGINEER," and Granite 
needed UDOT's permission to change the traffic control methods. (See Johnson Opening 
Br. at 23.) Thus, Granite did not have the ability to carry out the injury-causing aspects 
of the work in its own way, and as such the retained control doctrine applies. 
C. UDOT is vicariously liable for Granite's negligence. 
In addition to being liable for its own negligence, UDOT is also vicariously liable 
for Granite's negligence during the course of the project. 
It is specious for UDOT to argue that Utah courts "have never adopted" the 
"inherently dangerous" or "peculiar risk" doctrines. (UDOT Br. at 42.) In fact, the Utah 
Supreme Court has long recognized that an employer is liable for an independent con-
tractor's negligence when the work is inherently dangerous: 
The general rule that the employer of an independent contractor is 
not liable for an injury resulting to a third person from a tortious act 
committed by himself or his servant is subject to three exceptions: 
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,!(Ij where the injun was me ^ircci result of Hie stipulated work; \2) where 
that work was intrinsically dangerous, and the injury was a consequence 
of the failure of the contractor to take appropriate precautions: (3) where 
the ; .jur\ was caused o\ the nonperformance of an absolute duty owed by 
the emplo\er to t ie complainant, individual!;, or -o the class of persons to 
whirh he belongs. 
"It follows that, in any of these situations, the servants oi' the independent 
contractor are in effect the servants of the principal employer." 
Gleasonv. Salt Lake Citv. 94 Vuxh 1.71 I\2d 1225. 1732 (IW1) (emphasis added). See 
also Sullivan v. i tan uas service co. . . . ! ' • - oo-o / i hiMli 
(leeojjni/ing t;; •' *•*•.•: '" premises has nondelegable dut\ to keep premises safe 
for business invitees, and (b) an employer i- liable for independent contractor's 
negligence when the work '<• i ^u.^uii} ^angerous. or . „ b * dangei ous to 3th "i: s 
erML- v.r . .... . - > - • -; - .. :•-.- p l a t e r - -n: :• +27). 
The Court should also disregard UDOT's attempts to avoid section 418 of the 
Restatement of Torts. First; Mr. Johnson has not " u a i ^ u I\K nglu u, er,e seaiou 
because by citing ..eclion I I J1, Mi JOIIUMIJI !i;t* noi OIK I ' u w i .iii• on 'ippriil R iihi r 
••
 :
 -iv -. \ ciiir-L additional persuasive authority in support of a position he took before 
the trial co'jrt: \ hat I JDOT is vicariously liable for Granite's negligence under the pecu-
lidr •",>* ^nu maereo; uangei . * - •••..,- . ' - R 
878-7<;) I As Mr lohnson pointed out in his opening brief, section 418 merely presents a 
specific application of the principles set forth in sections 416 and 42T. i.e.. section 418 
establishes ii^; iiighway reconstruct;^: <-. .. •:.. -.,;... . t . ... ae OIOHL o^ t-^ .. 
a peci lliar risk of physical harm to otl leirs i mless special precautions are taken."1 Restate-
ment §4 io. 
To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must raise the issue before the trial court, 
and the trial court must have the opportunity to rule on it. See, e.g.. Hart v. Salt Lake 
County Com'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Below, Mr. iohnson argued that 
UDOT was vicariously liable for Granite's negligence because the project "created a 
peculiar risk of harm to the public" and was "inherently dangerous." (Johnson Oppo. 
Mem., R. 878, 79.) Mr. Johnson has thus preserved his right to make those same 
arguments, supported by additional persuasive authorities, on appeal.13 
Similarly, UDOT's argument that section 418 does not affect a state's immunity is 
merely a red herring. The issue of whether UDOT is vicariously liable for Granite's torts 
is not a question of immunity. In denying vicarious liability, UDOT did not claim any 
immunity under the Governmental Immunity Act; rather, UDOT claimed a defense under 
the basic common-law rules governing independent contractor relationships. 
Finally, the Court can ignore UDOT's "parade of horribles" argument that UDOT 
"could potentially be held liable for every motor vehicle accident caused by an unsafe 
driver." (UDOT Br. at 43.) UDOT's argument misrepresents Mr. Johnson's position. 
Mr. Johnson does not claim that UDOT is strictly liable for every accident on every high-
way. Rather, Mr. Johnson maintains that UDOT is vicariously liable for the negligence 
of an independent contractor that UDOT hired and supervised. There is nothing 
shocking about this proposition. 
Indeed, even if Mr. Johnson were limited to sections 416 and 427 on appeal, he 
would still prevail. Illustration 3 to section 416 holds that when a contractor places an 
obstacle in a street as part of a construction project, the contractor's employer is liable for 
injuries that result from the contractor's failure to protect drivers from that hazard. 
Restatement (Second) Torts § 416, cmt. e, illus. 3. This alone is enough to support Mr. 
Johnson's claim that UDOT is vicariously liable for Granite's negligence. 
-20-
UDOT can protect itself from tort exposure by supervising its contractor^ u> 
ensure that work is done safely and ii i accordance with applicable control pans, and 
requiring its contractors to pro\ ulc IIIMIMJICI' and m I1- indenmih UDO) ayauisf hahiiih 
:
 *'• -i r :- •• •. 1;-, vJ^r UDOT did in this case. Imposing liability on UDOT lor a 
contractor's ncLp^ence (Just like imposing liability ^n an employer for an employee's 
negligence) furthers important poiic; ^.oar. .\\ encouraging ^ . . v ;\m ,. ». ,<en ,.; ;'-; 
\ietniis of neglnietiiv H|)U •/ - both die design process and ii\e 
contracting process, is in a much better position to accomplish these goals, and. to bear 
and spread the risks inherent in highway construction, than are the inai\ IULUI. 
Ulal i ^ nigl lsMl) - . ^ e : ; ,:.: ; 
UDOT has not shown that the discretionary function exception 
applies to its negligence in failing to require concrete barriers, 
1 UDOT has not shown that tlie laiiur. -• ^ c a concrete 
barrier was essential to the realization of a basic 
governmental objective. 
UDOT has not explained how it was "essential to the realization of a basic 
governmental objective" to forego concrete barriers on the project T ' i^ U a;tempts to 
analogize th^ ...-. t- rvCcgdiL . a .-.. . . \." aec keegan v. vate. M" f> '\} ---IS 
(Viah 199?). In Keegan, the decision not to raise the median barrier was supported by 
"time and cost" considerations, in that raising the barrier woulu have necessitated delays 
and inconvenience to users ol liia highwuv and created n n4 thai ihr job "nmhl mil 1v 
done in<:\pcnsi\vh and with minimal disruption to traffic." Id at 624. In Keegan, a 
safety study was specifically performed ih:u m\ol\_\J ;: "comprehensive" study of 
accident rates, which COKJ. »W V. :n,h ;;;>. ; A^IW^ .... L .... ^
 i:. . - »- / 
..21. 
effect on safety." Id. The various factors and the costs and benefits were "circulated 
throughout and debated within" UDOT. Id, Thus, in Keegan the decision actually 
involved a balancing of significant, governmental factors, and the decision not to raise 
the barrier furthered the governmental objectives of convenient, efficient transportation. 
In contrast, the only reason barriers were not used in the present case was that they 
cost more money. Unlike the situation in Keegan, using barriers in the present case 
would have reduced the construction time, congestion, and inconvenience to the public, 
while increasing the safety of the driving public and the workers. 
UDOT claims that the decision not to use barriers involved an analysis of "execu-
tive branch budgetary cost limitations." (UDOT Br. at 35.) But UDOT presents no 
evidence of any such limitations, or that such limitations had anything to do with the 
failure to require barriers. This is critical, because as explained in Mr. Johnson's opening 
brief, additional cost cannot, in and of itself, be enough to immunize a negligent decision 
not to utilize appropriate safety feature. All we know regarding cost is that the barriers 
would have cost about $500,000, while UDOT had an annual construction budget of 
more than $220 million. UDOT presented no evidence that using concrete barriers on the 
Project would have compromised UDOT's ability to fulfill its statutory duties in any other 
fashion. 
If the decision in this case is immunized because of cost considerations, then every 
unsafe decision would be immunized, because one can always claim that safety features 
would have cost more money. Thus, more than mere cost is required. 
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III III " prcsuil case, I'D* ' - i'> v.;-*' <:.\'- rilrcrr^ iti*. •.-. and this decision was 
not supported by any significant governmental policies. Thus, UDOT has not shown that 
the decision to opt for this alternative UJ^ 'essenik;, ,. iiu. reaii/.air ,*. , . 'c 
gtneniiiienUtl objeeti\e.M ami iV< such H|M»] has nmf shnwn ilui tin* disi'iviinnary 
function exception bars Mr. Johnson's claims for UDOT's negligent failure to provide a 
barrier to separate traffic from the cutouts. 
2 UDOT has not ,10 decisions involved the 
actual exercise ^ A^H^ >"n;cv evaluation at the immu-
nized level 
Finally, UDOT has not shown that there was any "serious and extensive policy 




- " ' " .ruiiilt- -. > !){)!', 199v U'i Am 
227, <j€h 27, 33, 986 P.2d 752. Gi\en the absence of an\ serious policy factors supporting 
UDOT's ultimate decision, a jury could reasonably infer mat M.. .! e! e\ re did not actually 
C O n > A . J ' ; ' ' .t : > i. u. . . ^ . ' j ! . : ..v.. s • ( • ' • - • • ' • v . 
of barriers. Similarly, a jun could conclude that under the Utah Code, Mr. LeFevre's job 
was to "execute" policy, not to create policy. :See Utah Code Ann. § 72-l-205(3)(a). Mr. 
I /e'Fevre testified that 1 lis ii i\ ol v ei nei it \* • itl 1 tl le I ay toi 1 Clearfield Project w as a roi itii :te, 
eve*- i.^ v matte:- Tv. 942.) Thus, it would be error to conclude that UDOT has 
established, as a matter of law, that the failure to use a concrete barrier on the Project, a. 
decision ,:iu. ice unvcii^ ^ . V^IUK/J., acjiLi^u • ^ . • „» . . -
exercise of basic policy e\ ah lation at the in inn inized le\ el " 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff/Appellant Craig Jolinson therefore respectfully requests that the Court 
reverse the order granting summary judgment and remand tl le mattei tc tl :ie trial coi n t foi 
fi lither proceedings. 
DATED: April j3 , 2004. 
til<ll)l.i-/i \\ AKD o. ->!!."v\V 
Mrik M. Ward 
j ;PCu w v^nHx • 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
feL P.rr 
Stephen P. Horvat 
Attorneys for Appellant Cniin JOIIUMIJUI 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBITS 
7. Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant UDOT's Motion for Summary 
Judgment R. 862-880. 
8. Order of Summary Judgment and Dismissal With Prejudice, R. 1157-60. 
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IN I I IE SECOND Jt JDICIAI DIS1 RIC I COl JR 1 01 ' DAVIS COT INI '"\ 
STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
Ci\A'< -• JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENI 
OF TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF 
CALIFORNIA, dba GIBBONS & REED 
COMPANY, and JOHN DOES I - V, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION ' ' ' 
DEFENDANT UDOT'S MOTIOV 
FOR SUMMARY JI JDGEMF v? 
ddnc Thomas Lav 
lr *i:'" • ••• s i•• • * v •"'\ii.i' memorandum in opposition to Defendant Utah Department 
of Transportation's Motion lor Summan Judgment; 
F A C T S 
1. On or about September 14,1996, the plaintiff was seriously injured when his vehicle, 
traveli ng approximately 65 mph, dropped i nto a 12 inch pavement cut-out on 1-15. See deposition 
of Trooper Greg Lundell pg. 31-38 - Exhibit 1; and accident photos - Exhibit 5. 
Defendant State of I Jtah, Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") hired 
Defendant Granite Construction Company of I Jtah ("Granite") to perform construction on the section 
of 1-15 ("herein after1 "I ayton-Clearfield Project") where the plaintiff was injured. See UDOT's 
motion for summery judgment. 
T K< vr
"- (-ri-'inal traffic control pla n was designed when with a 55mph speed limit. 
Despite Granite's objections, the speed limit was 65 mph when the plaintiff was injured. See granite 
letter date 3/20/96 and 7/2/96- Exhibit 2. 
4. UDOT"s traffic control plan called for a white solid line followed by a two foot buffer 
zone before the placement of plastic barrels in order to properly separate the temporary travel lane 
from the 12 inch deep construction cut-outs. See Traffic Control Plan, Phase 3 (when two lanes are 
open) - Exhibit 3; and deposition of UDOT Project Engineer, Kent Nichols, pg 29 -31 - Exhibit 4. 
5. UDOT's traffic control plan was not followed: 
a. White stripping was not used between the second lane of travel and the 
construction cut-outs. See pictures attached as Exhibit 5 
b. There was not a two foot buffer zone between the lane and the cut-outs. On 
the contrary, some of the barrels were placed inside the cut-outs . See picture 
- Exhibit 5. 
c. On the night of the accident, there were missing barrels. See deposition of 
Trooper Greg Lundell, pg. 18 - Exhibit L 
6. UDOT personnel were supervising on the project daily and were aware Granite was 
not meeting the requirements of the traffic control plan. UDOT took no corrective action. See 
deposition of UDOT Project Engineer, Kent Nichols, pg. 51 - Exhibit 4; and deposition ofPaskett, 
pg. 58 - Exhibit 6. 
7. Although the Manual Uniform Traffic Control Devices ("MUTCD") requires concrete 
barriers to divide construction from the motoring public if there over a six-inch drop off in pavement 
next to travel lanes, UDOT's Regional One Manager. Dyke LeFevre (herein after "LeFevre") decided 
to use plastic barriers, a much cheaper alternative. See deposition of Phil Paskett, pg 11-12- Exhibit 
6; see also deposition of Dyke LeFevre, pg. 102-103 - Exhibit 7. 
8. LeFevre, who had only recently been hired as the Region One Manager, did not 
consult any of his UDOT superiors or the FHA regarding his initial decision to use plastic barriers 
rather than concrete barriers on the Lay ton-Clear field Project. LeFevre admitted his decision to use 
2 
plastic barrels was no different than the type of decisions he makes ever)' day. He testified there was 
nothing special about his decisioi i on this project, and ii i fa<: :1
 ; it v /as part of 1 lis daily cli iti.es foi 
UDOT. See deposition of LeFevre, pg. 3, and pg. 91 - 92\ andpg. 102-103 - Exhibit 7, 
I -eFev re did. n :.) f h ire anyone on I he I .ay ton-Clearfieldprc >ject to perform a safety study 
on the use of plastic barrels rather than the MI Y\'CD mandated concrete barriers. See deposition of 
LeFevre, pg. r \/ 7. 
s 'DOTplans do not identify the individual who designed theLayton-Clearfield traffic 
control plan. V t deposition of LeF Jevre, pg. 86-87 - Exhibit / 
LeFevre can not remember who originally recommended the use of plastic barriers 
but admits it could, have been, a lower level employee. See deposition of LeFevre, pg. 88-89 - Exhibit 
/. 
1,2. In. March, shortly after the project had commenced, Granite contacted UDOl ?s project 
engineer requesting a new traffic control plan which used concrete barriers. See letters dated 
3/20/96, 3/21/96, and 3/29/96 - E\ninn . 
i j . Granite's proposal for a new traffic control plan was denied by UDOTs .Project 
Engineer, Kent Nichols, unless compromises were made. The Layton-Clearfield was Nichols first 
project with pavement cut-outs. See letter dated 4/2/96 - Exhibit 2: and deposition of Nichols, pg, 
4~ - Exhibit 4. 
14. In July, Granite proposed a. "change order" to the existing traffic control plan, 
requesting the plastic barrels be replaced with concrete barriers and the speed limit be reduced to the 
intended 55 m.p.h. Granite cited om/oinjj salciv issues. UDOT's Project Engineer sent the change 
order request, with a letter encouraging LeFevre to approve Granite's request; copies of the letter 
were sent to other si ipervisors as well but there is':n.o evidence they were involved in the decision. 
See letters dated 7/2/96 - Exhibit 2. 
15. There was never a formal response to the proposed change order but UDOT has 
3 
acknowledged it is the Project Engineer's responsibility to respond to change orders. See deposition 
ofLeFevre, pg. 38-39 - Exhibit 7. 
16. UDOT"s traffic control plan required that during phase four of the Lay ton Clearfield 
Project, when plaintiffs accident occurred, there should have only one open lane of travel in order 
to provide distance between the construction cut-outs and the motoring public. See Special 
Provision, Supplemental Specification 108.4.2.6 - Exhibit 8; and Traffic Control Plan, Phase 4 -
Exhibit 9. 
17. The pavement cut-outs during phase four were 12 inches deep; some were over a 100 
feet long and 12 feet wide. See pictures - Exhibit 5. 
18. UDOT's field engineer and/or inspector, gave Granite the authority to open two lanes 
of traffic during phase four when Granite's workers were not inside of the construction cut-offs. By 
opening two lanes of travel, the motoring public was allowed to drive adjacent to the cut-outs with 
no barriers preventing their vehicles from entering the gapping holes. See deposition of Jimmie 
Keyes, pg. 36, In 14 -pg. 37, ln3 - Exhibit 10. 
19. The FHA "Guidelines for Mitigating Pavement Dropoffs in Construction and 
Maintenance Work Zones" state that "any dropoff is considered hazardous, but those greater than 
2 inches, left overnight, and immediately adjacent to traffic have a high accident potential". 
Accordingly, the FHA set forth five recommendations as mitigating measures. When operating the 
Layton-Clearfieid project, UDOT failed to follow any of the recommended guidelines pertaining to 
pavement dropoffs. See memorandum from US. Dept. of Trans., FHA , dated December 1, 1986 -
Exhibit!].. 
20. Plaintiff was traveling in the second lane of travel, which was opened by UDOT 
during phase four of the construction in violation of their own traffic control plan, when plaintiffs 
vehicle's tire dropped into a 12 inch construction cut-out. See deposition of Trooper Lundell, pg. 
25-26 - Exhibit 1. 
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In addition to Plaintiffs foregoing statement of facts, which dispute the facts alleged in 
UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff individually disputes UDOT's "undisputed 
facts'" by UDOT's paragraph numbers. Plaintiffs disputes Fact Nos. 3,5,6,20,21,22,23,24, 
and 26 as follows: 
UDOT's Alleged Fact #3: 
The decision to use barrels rather than concrete harriers to channel traffic throughout this 
project area was made by the uppermost officials in the UDOT organization. 
Plaintiff disputes this conclusion because it is inconsistent with the evidence. There is no evidence 
any of the "uppermost officials" were involved in the decision. After UDOT drafted his affidavit, 
LeFevre testified he made the specific decision and does not recall discussing with his superiors. See 
deposition of LeFevre, pg. 91, In 13 -pg 92, In 7 - Exhibit 7. 
UDOT's Alleged Fact #5* 
The final decision to include plastic barrels rather than concrete barrier in the proposed 
traffic control plan was made Dyke LeFevre in consultation with Clint Topham Several Key 
factors were weighed as part of this decision, including the following: 
(a) The safety of project workers and the motoring public; 
(b) The costs associated with using barrels versus concrete barriers; and 
(c) The impact on traffic congestion by increasing or decreasing the overall time 
to complete the project 
Plaintiff disputes this fact based on LeFevre's deposition which was taken following his affidavit. 
UDOT compiled portions of LeFevre's affidavit to form the above misleading statement. LeFevre 
testified that he was "not sure he talked to [Topham] specifically about the barrels" in fact, he 
"probably [did] not" when he made the decision to eliminate concrete barriers from the proposed 
traffic control plan. See deposition of LeFevre, pg 91, In 13-pg 92, In 7 - Exhibit 7 The only 
discussion LeFevre had with Topham occurred after a change order had been requested; during the 
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execution and operation of the already formulated traffic control plan. Moreover, Topham did not 
mutually consult on the change order. On the contrary, he left the decision unilaterally to LeFevre 
based solely on the costs involved. LeFevre, and others, have testified LeFevre rejected the change 
order based on the costs. See deposition of LeFevre, pg. 98 -100 - Exhibit 7. 
UDOT's Alleged Fact #6: 
As part of UDOT's decision making process, Dyke LeFevre consulted with the Federal 
Highway Administration about the use of barrels rather than concrete barriers as channeling 
devices 
Plaintiff disputes this statement based on the deposition testimony of LeFevre. UDOT's statement 
implies the FHA was consulted on using plastic barrels on the Layton-Clearfield project. On the 
contrary, the FHA was not consulted on the use of plastic barrels on the Layton-Clearfield project 
during the initial decision or as part of the change order requested by Granite. See deposition of 
LeFevre, pg. 98, In 16 - In 21 - Exhibit 7. 
UDOT's Alleged Fact #20: 
Following receipt of Mr. Nichols' 7/2/96 memorandum concerning the use of pre-cast 
concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project, upper UDOT management personnel, 
including Region One Director, Dyke LeFevre, reviewed and rejected the proposal based 
upon the same cost-benefit consideration that motivated the prior decision to use plastic 
barrels instead of concrete barriers. 
Plaintiff disputes this entire statement. There is no evidence that the July change order was reviewed 
by upper management. Furthermore, evidence illustrates it was a financial consideration which 
motivated the rejection. See deposition of Griffin, pg. 48, 50, In 17- 23 - Exhibit 12; and LeFevre, 
pg. 99 - Exhibit 7; also see letter dated 4/2/96 denying concrete barriers based on costs- Exhibit 2. 
UDOT's Alleged Fact #21: 
Pursuant to the terms of UDOT/Granite contract for the Layton-Clearfield Project, Granite 
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was allowed to utilize the means and methods of construction it desired in order to carry out 
the joint repair and slab replacement in the Layton-Clearfield Project. 
Plaintiff disputes Granite had exclusive authority. Granite could only utilize the means and methods 
which satisfied the extensive, detailed traffic control plan put forth by UDOT. UDOT supervised 
controlled the means through financial approval/disapproval and the methods through UDOT 
personnel. Only UDOT had authority to alter the traffic control plan which dictated the specific 
methods of construction. 
UDOTs Alleged Fact #22: 
Pursuant to the terms of the UDOT/Graniie contract, UDOT allowed the contractor to select 
the means and methods by which the proposed traffic control plan would be implemented 
and enforced. 
Plaintiff disputes Granite had the authority to select implementation and enforcement. UDOT 
required their inspector, project engineer, etc. be involved at every level of execution. UDOT had 
the authority to instruct Granite personnel. 
UDOTs Alleged Fact #23: 
Granite's own personnel have acknowledged thai, pursuant to he terms of the UDOT-
Granite contract, Granite could have provided pre-cast concrete barriers for the Layton-
Clearfield Project at is own cost, but chose not to do so. 
Plaintiff disputes the implication that Granite was liable for not using concrete barriers. Although 
UDOT gave Granite the authority to implement the change order if Granite would bear the costs, 
UDOT has acknowledged they never expected Granite would cover the costs of the concrete barriers. 
See deposition of Paskett, pg. 43-44 - Exhibit 11. 
UDOTs Alleged Fact #24. 
Granite's 3/20/96, 3/29/96 and 7/2/96 letters to UDOT also raised concerns over the speed 
limit throughout the construction zone, and requested that the speed limit be reduced from 
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65 m.p.h to 55 m.p.h throughout the construction zone 
Plaintiff disputes UDOT's implication that the 55 mph reduced speed was Granite's creation. On 
the contrary, UDOT's traffic control plan was designed with a 55 mph speed limit but the speed limit 
was unilaterally increased to 65 mph prior to commencement of the project. 
UDOTs Alleged'Fact #26: 
On or about September 14, 1996, the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident 
within the confines of the Lay ton-Clearjield Project when his car left the (raveled portion of 
the highway and entered into the construction zone where it collided with one or more holes 
created as part of the ongoing slab replacements. 
Plaintiff disputes UDOT's factual description of the accident. UDOT's statement that plaintiffs 
vehicle left the traveled portion of the highway implies plaintiffs vehicle left the lane of traffic. This 
is a highly disputed fact. UDOT failed to mark off their construction zone from the temporary lane 
of traffic and thus plaintiff contends his car was actually inside the white dotted traveling lane when 
his vehicle's tire dropped into the deep construction cut-out. See pictures attached as Exhibit 5. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DISPUTED FACTS PREVENT UDOT'S DISMISSAL 
A motion for summary judgment is only proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure Summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances. 
Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996) Moreover, determining whether an act of 
alleged negligence qualifies as a discretionary function is ua fact-intensive inquiry that, by its very 
nature, is not particularly amenable to summary judgment". Trujillo v UDOT. 986 P.2d 752 (Utah 
App. 1999) citing Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 846 (Utah 1990) and Rocky Mountain 
Thrift Stores v. Salt Lake City 784 P2d 459, 464 (Utah 1989). 
This case is particularly fact intensive since there are multiple acts of alleged negligence by 
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UDOT. Plaintiff has illustrated disputed facts as to how the decision was made to use plastic barrels 
on the Layton-Clearfield project, and by whom. The deposition testimony of UDOTs former 
Regional Manager is contrary to the alleged "undisputed" facts made in UDOT's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Further, there are disputed tacts pertaining to UDOT's refusal to follow 
recommendations presented by Granite. Moreover, there is contradicting testimony from UDOT and 
Granite employees regarding the anticipated speed limit, the responsibility of mis-placed plastic 
barrels, the failure to provide white line delineation and failure to implement mandatory buffer zones. 
A jury could determine one or more of these factual disputes was an operational act of negligence 
by UDOT. The case is set for ten days of trial with over 15 witnesses due to disputed tacts which 
must be determined before liability can be assessed. UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment fails 
to address any of the disputed factual issues of this case, other than their decision to use plastic 
barrels. Each negligence allegation, including the decision to use plastic barrels, involves disputed 
material facts which are within the province of the jury. In accordance with the disputed facts 
enumerated in pg. 1 - 8 of this memorandum, UDOT is precluded from summary judgment as a 
matter of Utah law. 
II. UNDER SECTION 63-30-98, UDOT'S GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IS WAIVED 
AND THERE IS NO APPLICABLE EXCEPTION TO THEIR WAVIER OF IMMUNITY 
Plaintiff stipulates with UDOT's assertion that this case satisfies the first two prongs of the 
three prong test developed by the Utah Supreme Court for determining whether the governmental 
immunity act is applicable to a particular action. First, the construction of the Layton-Clearfield 
Project is a governmental function under the Governmental Immunity Act. Second, under Section 
63-30-08, UDOT's governmental immunity is waived since this action is the result of an injury 
caused by a defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of a highway. Plaintiff disagrees with UDOT's 
application of the third prong of the test. The third prong of the test examines whether there is an 
exception to the government's waiver. UDOT alleges their actions were discretionary and thus they 
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qualify for the discretionary exception enumerated under Section 63-30-10(1). Plaintiff contends 
UDOT's actions were not discretionary and UDOT does not qualify for any exception. Plaintiff 
maintains UDOT is liable for the plaintiffs injuries because UDOT created an unsafe and dangerous 
condition on 1-15. 
A. Dyke LeFevre's decision to use plastic barrels versus concrete barrels was not a 
broad based discretionary policy decision 
Plaintiff alleges UDOT was negligent for using plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers. 
The Manual Uniform Traffic Control Devices ("MUTCD") requires concrete barriers to protect the 
motoring public when performing construction cut-outs deeper than 2 inches. UDOT's personnel 
testified they are trained to follow the MUTCD. On the Layton-Clearfield project MUTCD was not 
followed. The initial decision to use, less expensive, plastic barrels was made by Dyke LeFevre, 
UDOT's regional one manager. UDOT alleges the decision was discretionary. Under Truiillo v. 
UDOT, 986 P.2d 752 (Utah App. 1999), LeFevre's decision to use plastic barrels versus concrete 
barrels does not qualify as a discretionary function. 
In Truiillo, the plaintiffs were injured in a highway construction zone without concrete 
barriers. The plaintiffs alleged UDOT's decision to use plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers 
was negligent, as well as UDOT's failure to follow the traffic control plan and consider corrective 
action recommended by the contractor. The trial court granted UDOT's motion for summary 
judgment based on the "discretionary" exception. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded, holding UDOT"s actions and decisions were not discretionary. 
Inthe Truiillo case, UDOT relied onKeeganv. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995); the 
same case UDOT is relying on in the present action. In Keegan, UDOT resurfaced a highway three 
times. Each time they resurfaced, they formulated a new traffic control plan and presented the 
revised plan to the FHA. When resurfacing, UDOT had to consider whether to raise the height of 
the concrete barriers. UDOT engaged in extensive measures, involving a significant number of 
10 
senior officials to formulate a broad based policy decision pertaining to the height of previously 
installed concrete barriers. First, UDOT hired a safety studies engineer to perform a study of 
accident rates in the area where the concrete barrier was erected. Second, the engineer compared 
those rates with other roads and compiled his various findings to create a comprehensive safety study 
report. The safety studies engineer concluded that leaving the barrier at if s current height would not 
adversely affect safety. Third, UDOT hired an engineer to perform a written cost-risk analysis based 
on the findings of the safety report. Fourth, UDOT's senior officials debated the issues presented 
by the expert reports. Fifth, UDOT presented the proposal to the FHA before carrying through with 
further re-surfacing. The court found UDOT's decision process was the "result of serious and 
extensive policy evaluation, judgment and expertise in numerous areas of concern". Id at 625 citing 
Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad 842 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1992). In the case at hand, UDOT failed 
to undertake the same extensive policy evaluation which was utilized in Keegan. UDOT's actions 
in this case are virtually identical to UDOT's actions in Trujillo. 
In Trujillo, UDOT alleged it's decision to use plastic barrels was made after weighing the 
relative risks and benefits. UDOT presented evidence of discussions between the project design 
engineer and UDOT's region one design engineer. UDOT also presented evidence that the plans and 
specifications were approved through a multi-level process; UDOT implied the decision was 
considered above the regional level. UDOT maintained they were not required to consult written 
studies and relied on Keegan, for the proposition that highway median design and lane separation 
are discretionary functions. The court disagreed. The court found the discussions between the 
project engineer and the regional one manager, along with the alleged higher-level discussions, did 
not rise to the immunized policy-making level. Unlike the facts of Keegan, UDOT did not hire 
engineers to study the safety concerns. UDOT did hold meetings with multiple high level policy 
makers. UDOT did not have written evidence of policy considerations, nor did not they submit the 
particular issue to the FHA. The court held the discretionary exception did not apply. 
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Similar to Trujillo, UDOT did not undertake intense scrutiny in this case. As inTrujillo, the 
decision was made between the project manager, who had never worked with concrete slab 
replacement and traffic before, and the regional one manager, who had been recently hired to the 
position. In Trujillo, a low-level unqualified employee designed the traffic control plan. In this 
case, UDOT's plans do not even identify the designer. Also similar to Trujillo, UDOT alleges a 
higher level of scrutiny took place but fails to establish the assertion with evidence. UDOT's motion 
for summary judgment implies LeFevre's affidavit proves he consulted Clint Topham in making the 
initial decision to use plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers. On the contrary, in LeFevre\s 
deposition following UDOT's submission of his affidavit, LeFevre admitted he had general 
discussions about the traffic control plan but he does not recall any specific discussions on the 
concrete barrier issue. This is identical to the facts in TrujilJo, wherein UDOT illustrated the 
approval of the traffic plan underwent a multi-level decision process but their was no evidence, only 
suggestions, that the concrete barrier issue was discussed at the higher level. UDOT's actions in this 
case fit squarely under the Trujillo case. 
The evidence illustrates the decision to use plastic barrels did not involve multiple high level 
officials and supplemental studies resulting in a broad based policy decision. On the contrary, 
LeFevre admitted his decision to use plastic barrels was no different than the type of decisions he 
makes every day. He testified there was nothing special about his decision on this project, and in 
fact, it was part of his daily duties for UDOT. Under Keegan. the discretionary function exception 
udoes not extended to those acts and decisions taking place at the operational level . . . which 
concern routine, everyday matters, not requiring evaluation of board policy factors."' _Id. at 623 citing 
Carrol v. State, 496 P.2d 888, 891 (1972). The decision in this case was a typical operational 
decision, made by a regional manager after input from his project manager. Topham and Nielson 
approved the entire traffic control plan as a matter of procedure, but there is no evidence they were 
involved with the decision to use plastic barrels. Similarly, the FHA approved the entire project but 
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there is no evidence they took part or even consulted on the use of plastic barrels in the Layton-
Clearfield project. Moreover, there is no undisputed evidence that anyone, even LeFevre, undertook 
extensive evaluation of policy issues. It was only eight years after the decision that LeFevre alleges 
he privately weighed policy issues before making the decision. This is not enough to invoke the 
discretionary exception. Identical to Trujillo, UDOT's decision to use plastic barrels on the Layton-
Clearfield project, in opposition to the MUTCD guidelines, does not rise to the level of policy 
making discretion. 
1. UDOT's rejection of Granite's change order was part of the execution of the traffic 
control plan and was clearly operational. 
If the court where to find the original decision to use plastic barrels in violation of MUTCD 
was discretionary, the subsequent rejection of Granite's change order requesting barriers was still 
non-discretionary. In Keegan, the Utah Supreme Court distinguished discretionary and non-
discretionary decisions on the basis of whether the decision in question involved the formulation of 
policy or the execution of an already-formulated policy. M at 623 citing Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 
517 , 5919 (Utah 1980). Accordingly, if the court were to find LeFevre's original decision (made 
before Granite became involved in the project) was a policy making decision, then clearly UDOT's 
decision to reject Granite's change order was an execution of that already-formulated policy. An 
execution of an already-formulated policy is non-discretionary. The execution of the traffic control 
plan was operational. Granite was complaining of the practicalities involved in the execution of the 
traffic control plan and Granite, as well as UDOT's project manager believed the safety concerns 
warranted replacing the plastic barrels with concrete barriers. The change order was rejected due to 
financial concerns. UDOT admitted they would have approved the change if Granite would have 
beared the expense. 
The change order was requested based on the daily operational problems Granite was having 
with the Layton-Clearfield project; there was no high level consideration or evaluation of broad 
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policy factors as required to be considered a discretionary function. Although LeFevre claims to 
have had a conversation with Topham about Granite's request, LeFevre testified Topham left the 
decision to LeFevre based on costs. The change order was not put in front of the FF1A. Once again, 
there was no intensive review. The only written communication regarding the change order took 
place between Kent Nichols, UDOT's project engineer, and Granite. Thus, UDOT has failed to 
illustrate the rejection of Granite's change order was a basic policy-making level decision and UDOT 
is precluded from governmental immunity. 
B. UDOT's decision to open a second lane of traffic, in conflict with UDOT's traffic 
control plan, was an operational decision which is not subject to immunity 
UDOT's traffic control plan for the Laylon-Clcarficld project indicated only one open lane 
of travel during phase four of the construction because of the cut-outs in the road. Utilizing only 
one lane would have prevented vehicles from traveling directly adjacent to the open cut-outs. 
Plaintiff was injured when traveling in a second lane which should have been closed. Granite's 
engineer testified he was given the authority to open the second lane by UDOT's project engineer 
and/or inspector. 
UDOT's decision to open a second lane of travel, in violation of their traffic control plan was 
unarguably an operational decision. It was made by a low-level UDOT employee. There is no 
evidence the employee consulted upper management or weighed any policy factors. Thus. UDOT's 
operational decision to open a second lane is not subject to the discretionary exception. This act. in 
and by itself, precludes UDOT's dismissal, notwithstanding LeFevre's decision to forego concrete 
barriers. 
C. UDOT's failure to properly execute it's traffic control plan was operational 
UDOT's traffic control plan specified precautions that need to be implemented anytime two 
lane of travel were open on the Layton-Clearfield Project. UDOT's traffic control plan required the 
two travel lanes to be separated from the construction cut-outs by a solid white line, with a two foot 
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buffer zone followed by plastic barrels. The precautions were not implemented. Not only was 
plaintiff traveling in a lane which was intended to be closed, but it was a lane which was not 
delineated by a white line, a buffer zone or consistent plastic barrels as required by the traffic control 
plan. UDOT was aware of the traffic control plan violations but failed to take corrective action. 
UDOT's personnel worked on the construction project daily. UDOT's agents were hired to supervise 
and assist Granite in executing UDOT's traffic control plan. UDOT negligently failed. 
UDOT alleges their negligent supervision amounts to "negligent inspection" under Section 
63-30-10(4). This exception holds the government immune from "failure to make an inspection or 
by making an inadequate or negligent inspection". Yet, the Utah Supreme Court has clarified in 
Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995, (Utah 1993) that this exception "most frequently 
arises when the entity undertakes inspections to assure compliance with building, fire, electric and 
other safety codes." Id at 997. 
In Ericksen, a governmental construction inspector was inspecting the work of contractors 
on city property. The Utah Supreme Court distinguished between code-compliance inspections 
where a government employee inspects the property of a third party versus when a government 
employee is inspecting his own employer's property, not for code-compliance, but for compliance 
with contractual specifications. Id at 997-998. This distinction was reaffirmed in Nixon v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 898 P.2d 265 (Utah 1995). The court found inspection of contractual obligations did not 
qualify for the exception under Section 63-30-10(4). Similarly, UDOT's project inspector was 
inspecting his own employer's property for compliance with contractual specifications, i.e. traffic 
control plan. Moreover, UDOT had more than just an "inspector" working on the Layton-Clearfield 
project. UDOT engineers and personnel worked on the project daily to assist in proper execution 
of the traffic control plan. There is no immunity for negligent supervision and negligent execution 
of a traffic control plan. UDOT's actions on the project site do not qualify under any exception and 
UDOT could be found liable under Utah law. 
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D. A jury could find UDOT exercised authority over Granite and determine UDOT is 
liable for Granite's negligence 
UDOT relies on Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999) to assert is not liable for 
Granite's negligence. However, there are several circumstances in which a jury is allowed to find 
an employer vicariously liable for the negligence of an independent contractor. Plaintiff relies on 
Thompson to assert UDOT is liable under all, or one, of the following: 
1. UDOT is liable under the active participation standard 
"Under the 'active participation' standard, a principal employee is subject to liability for 
injuries arising out of its independent contractor's work if the employer is actively involved in, or 
asserts control over, the manner of performance of the contracted work. Thompson at 327 citing 
Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So.2d 56, 60 (Fla. 1973). In Thompson the Supreme Court relied on the 
Arizona case of Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc., 825 P.2d 5, (AZ 1992) for promulgating their 
adoption of retained control liability, under the "active participation" standard: 
"In Lewis, the general contractor interfered with the subcontractors'1 s method of performing 
the work and instructed that a quicker but less safe method be implemented. A worker was 
injured as a direct result of the dangerous condition created by the general contractor's 
method. The court concluded on the basis of these facts, that the general contractor exercised 
sufficient control over the means use in performing the contracted work to subject it to 
retained control liability." Thompson v. Jess. 979 P.2d 322 at 328 (Utah 1999) 
Similarly, UDOT interfered by having Granite open two lanes of traffic even though it was clearly 
a less safe method. The plaintiff was injured as a direct result of that dangerous condition created 
by UDOT's direction. Accordingly, UDOT exercised sufficient control over Granite to subject 
UDOT to retained control liability. 
2. UDOT is liable for the failure to provide concrete barriers under Section 413 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Section 413 of the Restatement states: 
"Duty to Provide for Taking of Precautions Against Dangers Involved in Work Entrusted to 
Contractor" 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should 
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recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical 
harm to other unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm 
caused to them by the absence of such precautions if the employer 
(a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such precaution, or 
(b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the taking of such 
precautions. 
UDOT has implied that if the jury determines concrete barriers was the appropriate 
precaution, Granite is liable since UDOT later informed Granite they could use concrete barriers if 
Granite paid the expense. On the contrary, if the jury find it was negligent not to use concrete 
barriers than UDOT could be found vicariously liable for failing to provide in the contract that 
Granite use the special precaution, i.e. barriers. 
3. UDOT is vicarious liable for Granite under Section 416 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts 
Section 416 of the Restatement of Torts, states: 
"Work Dangerous in Absence of Special Precautions" 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should 
recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others 
unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them 
by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precaution, even 
though the employer has provided for such precautions in the contract or otherwise. 
Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322, 329 (Utah 1999) 
UDOT hired Granite to perform work which created a peculiar risk of harm to the public. 
UDOT's attempted to dictate some special precautions in the contract, i.e. white lines, buffer zones, 
barrel placement, etc. However, UDOT can still be held liable for the physical harm to the plaintiff 
as a result of Granite's failure to take such precautions. Assumably, this explains why UDOT had 
several personnel overseeing the project; UDOT needed to ensure the special precautions of the 
traffic control plan were implemented. However, UDOT's personnel failed to properly supervise and 
implement those precautions. Under Section 416, UDOT can be held vicariously liable for Granite's 
failure to use reasonable care. 
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4. UDOT is vicarious liable for Granite under Section 427 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts 
Section 427 of the Restatement of Torts states: 
"Negligence as to Danger Inherent in the Work" 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special danger to other 
which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal to the work, or 
which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate, when making the contract, is subject 
to liability for physical harm caused to such others by the contractor's failure to take 
reasonable precautions against such danger. Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322, 329 (Utah 
1999) 
Similar to Section 416, UDOT can be held vicariously liable for Granite's negligence. 
Section 427 illustrates that, with or without special precautions, an employer can be held liable for 
an independent contractor when the work is inherently dangerous to others. With the large number 
of vehicle traffic on 1-15 and the anticipated 12 in. deep, 105 ft long and 12 ft wide cut-outs, UDOT 
had reason to know the work was inherently dangerous. UDOT is unable to escape their liabiliry 
by transferring all negligence to Granite. 
CONCLUSION 
Multiple disputed facts prevent UDOT from prevailing on summary judgment. Moreover, 
none of UDOT"s actions in this case were protected by the discretionary exception of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Also, UDOT can be held vicariously liable for the actions of Granite. 
Based on the foregoing issues, plaintiff respectfully requests the court deny UDOT's motion for 
summary judgment. 
/df—— 
DATED this /j day of November, 2002. 
* „«w sat*?/, 
MIK NJ/WARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF UTAH, 
dba GIBBONS & REED COMPANY, 
JOHN DOES l-V, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 970700411 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
The above entitled matter came before the Honorable Thomas L Kay on the 18th 
day of November, 2002, for hearing on defendant Utah Department of Transportation's 
("UDOT") Motion for Summary Judgment. Attorney H. Scott Jacobson appeared for 
defendant UDOT, attorneys Erik M. Ward and Christopher L. Shaw appeared for plaintiff 
JAN 8 2003 
Layton District Court 
Craig Johnson, and attorney Scott W. Christensen appeared for defendant Granite 
Construction. The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file herein, and having heard 
the arguments of counsel for UDOT and plaintiff, and being otherwise fully apprised in the 
premises, now enters the following: 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. There are no genuine issues of material fact which would preclude summary 
judgment on plaintiff's claims against UDOT. Specifically, the Court finds that Facts 1-20 
on pages 1 -4 of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment 
do not conform with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, and therefore, those facts do not dispute UDOTs Statement of Facts. 
While plaintiff's response to UDOT Facts 3, 5, 6, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 26, found on 
pages 5-8 of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
does conform with Rule 4-501, plaintiff's response to those facts does not establish any 
genuine issues of fact which would preclude summary judgment. 
2. For the reasons stated in UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
supporting memoranda, and for the reasons stated by UDOT's counsel during the 
November 13, 2002 orai arguments, plaintiff's claims against UDOT must fail as a matter 
of iaw. 
3. The decisions made by UDOT Region One Director Dyke LeFevre 
surrounding the use of plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers on the Layton-
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Clearfield Project were decisions made at the policy-making level, and were immune from 
liability under the discretionary function exception of the Governmental Immunity Act. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1): see also Keeqan v. State of Utah. 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 
1995). 
4. Although plaintiff still has separate claims pending against co-defendant 
Granite Construction, there is no reason to delay the entry of final judgment on plaintiff's 
claims against UDOT. 
5. In order to avoid the possibility of multiple trials, the remaining claims 
between plaintiff and Granite Construction should be stayed pending the resolution of any 
appeal by plaintiff of the claims against UDOT. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. That UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
2. That all of plaintiffs claims against UDOT are DISMISSED with prejudice. 
3. That UDOT shall be awarded costs as prevailing party under Rule 54(d)(1) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in an amount to be established by affidavit, with 
interest to accrue at the rate provided for by law. 
4. That this Judgment shall be certified as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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5. That the remaining claims between plaintiff and Granite Construction shall 
be stayed pending the resolution of any appeal of the dismissal of the claims against 
UDOT. 
DATED this day of _ 
^muivj , 200? 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE THOMA$ L KAY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
^ ^ ^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Christopher LvShaw 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Scott W. Christensen 
Attorney for Granite Construction 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \5? day of December, 2002, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE was sent via U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Scott W. Christensen, Esq. 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Erik M. Ward, Esq. 
GRIDLEY, WARD, HAVAS, SHAW & THOMAS 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
4495.008 
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